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RECENT DECISIONS
AGENCY-ADVERSE INTERESTS.-Defendant, an automobile pro-
ducer, owned and operated plants in various states; among them were
a manufacturing plant in Michigan and an assembly plant in Georgia.
A labor union was the agent of both the Michigan and Georgia em-
ployees. When a dispute arose in the Michigan plant over the con-
struction of a labor union contract, the union ordered a strike. The
Michigan employees wanted to strike. Those in Georgia did not.
Thus, a conflict arose between those interests represented by the
union, namely, the interests of the Michigan employees and those of
the Georgia employees. Acting solely as agent for the Michigan
employees, the union ordered the strike. The Georgia employees
were unable to work because no parts were coming out of the Mich-
igan plant, and therefore instituted this action to recover unemploy-
ment compensation. Held, judgment for defendant reversed. The
Georgia employees are entitled to unemployment compensation for
the period they were unable to work because of the Michigan strike,
since the Georgia employees are not bound by the labor union's ac-
tions. Abercrombie et al. v. Ford Motor Co. et al., 59 S. E. 2d 664
(Ga. 1950).
It is commonly and correctly stated as a broad agency doctrine
that an agent owes the utmost good faith and absolute loyalty to his
principal in the furtherance of the latter's interests.1 This doctrine
is based on public policy and thus is applicable to all agency rela-
tions, regardless of the amount of compensation or the fact that the
agent is a volunteer at a nominal consideration. 2 Accordingly, there
has evolved the general rule that an agent can not properly serve
concurrently two principals whose interests are conflicting, without
their knowledge and consent.3 In a case where dual interests are
being served, the agent has a duty to his principal to make a full
disclosure of all the facts and circumstances without any ambiguity
or reservation. Thus, an indefinite or equivocal disclosure will not
be a sufficient discharge of his duty.4 However, even though a full
and fair disclosure has been made, still the agent will not be free to
i MECEEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 297 (3d ed. 1923).
2 Perry et aix. v. Engel et al., 296 Ill. 549, 130 N. E. 340 (1921).
3 Baird et al. v. Lascy et al., 71 Cal. App. 2d 142, 161 P. 2d 996 (1945);
Fort Valley Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 69
Ga. App. 120, 24 S. E. 2d 846 (1943) ; Burlington Say. Bank of Burlington, Vt.
v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America et al., 207 Iowa 809, 221 N. W. 796
(1928); Empire State Insurance Co. v. American Central Insurance Co., 138
N. Y. 446 (1893) ; Hawkins v. Byrn et al., 150 Tenn. 1, 261 S. W. 980 (1924);
State v. Rogers, 226 Wis. 39, 275 N. W. 910 (1937).4 Wendt v. Fischer et al., 243 N. Y. 439, 154 N. E. 303 (1926).
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bargain in his own behalf or in behalf of another adverse principal
until and unless he also receives the consent of his principal. This
consent may be express or implied.5
If an agent fails to perform his specified duty, and he does rep-
resent two adverse interests without making a full disclosure of such
facts,6 then the agent is not entitled to any compensation at all,7 and
if perchance the agent made a profit for himself while engaged in
this adverse employment, he must surrender it to the principal.8 It
is wholly within the principal's discretion to ratify the agent's acts
or repudiate them regardless of the agent's good faith and the fact
that no loss or injury has resulted to the principal because of the
agent's breach of duty.9 Since the principal's right to repudiate is
based on his lack of knowledge and consent, if one of the adverse
principals had knowledge of this double employment and acquiesced,
he would not be permitted to repudiate the transaction; z0 whereas
if the other principal was completely ignorant of the facts, only the
latter could disaffirm the transaction.11 Contracts procured by such
a breach of the agent's duty are voidable, and so the principal, who
is permitted by law to repudiate, must exercise his option before the
rights of innocent parties have intervened.' 2
The general rule that an agent is not permitted to serve two
principals in the same transaction without their knowledge and con-
sent is not applicable when the agent exercises no discretion and
acts merely to bring the pai-ties together.13  In such a case the agent
has no duty to make any disclosure to either principal, and he never-
theless will be entitled to his agreed compensation; both principals
will be bound by the acts of the agent within the scope of his
authority.' 4
0 Pope v. Harper, 40 Ga. App. 573, 150 S. E. 470 (1929).
6 Tausig v. Hart, 58 N. Y. 425 (1874) (agent bought from self while
purchasing agent for principal); W. W. Dillon & Co. v. Sharber et aux., 19
Tenn. App. 488, 90 S. W. 2d 533 (1936) (broker acted as agent for two land
owners in negotiating a trade) ; Becker et aux. v. Spalinger et aux., 174 Wis.
443, 183 N. W. 173 (1921) (agent of buyer received a secret commission from
the seller for doing act within the scope of his agency). But cf. Arthur v.
Georgia Cotton Co., 22 Ga. App. 431, 96 S. E. 232 (1918) (agent received
secret commission from opposite party for doing an act beyond scope of
agency).
7 Murray v. Beard et al., 102 N. Y. 505, 7 N. E. 553 (1886); Nekarda v.
Presberger, 123 App. Div. 418, 107 N. Y. Supp. 897 (1st Dep't 1908).
s Robert Reis & Co. v. Volck, 151 App. Div. 613, 136 N. Y. Supp. 367
(1st Dep't 1912).
9 Bish v. First Nat Bank of Brighton, 78 Colo. 326, 241 Pac. 537 (1925).10 F. & W. Grand Five-Ten-Twenty-Five Cent Stores, Inc. v. Eiseman, 160
Ga. 321, 127 S. E. 872 (1925).
11 MEcHEm, op. cit. supra note 1, § 299.
12 Napier v. Adams, 166 Ga. 403, 143 S. E. 566 (1928).
'2 Kondos v. Mfouser, 64 Okla. 168, 166 Pac. 707 (1917) (acted as middle-
man to bring together buyer and seller of restaurant).
14Knauss v. Gottfried Krueger Brewing Co., 142 N. Y. 70, 36 N. E. 867(1894). The same results will follow when an agent is serving conflicting
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In the present case, the court adhered to the general well estab-
lished rule concerning an adverse agency relationship. The plaintiff
knew that the union was acting as agent for both the plants and
voiced its dissent to the strike so as to repudiate the action of the
union. Thus, it would be unjust to hold the plaintiff bound to the
acts of the union, for although the plaintiff did have full knowledge,
he did not freely consent to, or ratify the acts of the agent union.
CHARITABLE SUBSCRIPTIONS - ENFORCEMENT - GROWTH OF
PRoMIssORY ESTOPPEL.-The St. Marks Church, the plaintiff, desir-
ing to build a new edifice, found that its funds were insufficient to
meet the plans as drawn. The testator agreed to subscribe $25,000
if the church would approve the plans without modification and ob-
tain a loan of $60,000 on a mortgage arranged by the testator. The
church complied. The subscription was conditioned for cancellation
upon written notice of change in the subscriber's financial condition,
and ". .. that it shall not be considered binding upon my estate."
The church commenced this action upon the agreement when the
executor resisted the claim for the balance. Held, the agreement
bound the estate. The testator knew that his subscription was the
factor that induced the adoption of the plans without modification.
The court stated that ". . . it must be held that Mr. Atwater had no
desire or intention of limiting his pledge. There is no question that
the defendant is well able to pay the sum in dispute, and its conten-
tions, I am sure do not reflect the thoughts of its testate." Rector,
Church Wardens, Vestrymen St. Marks Church, Westhampton
Beach v. Bankers Trust Co., 197 Misc. 32, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 554
(Sup. Ct. 1949).
A subscription is a written agreement to furnish a designated
sum of money or its equivalent for a particular purpose.' A "chari-
table subscription" is in essence a promise to make a gift,2 a promise
not supported by consideration. 3 Notwithstanding the absence of
consideration, the need for enforcing such agreements was recognized
as early as 1828.4 The resulting decisions ". . . indicate the presence
interests and both principals, having full knowledge of all the facts, give their
free consent to the agency. Bell v. McConnell, 37 Ohio St 396 (1881).
' BouviE's LAW DICTIONARY 3171 (8th ed., Rawle, 1914); BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 1117 (3d ed. 1933).
25Twenty-third St. Baptist Church v. Cornell, 117 N. Y. 601, 23 N. E. 177(1890).
3 "The very term 'charitable subscription' indicates that the subscriber's
promise is made as a gift and not in return for consideration." 1 WmiUsToN,
CoNnUCTs § 116 (revised ed., Thompson, 1936).
4 "It cannot be maintained that objects so important shall be frustrated
.. . by the rights of individuals to withdraw their contributions or refuse to
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